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ABSTRACT
Judicial reasoning and rhetoric should be mutually reinforcing, but
often they end up at odds. Edwards v. Vannoy offers an unusually rich
opportunity to explore this tension. First, the watershed exception,
though declared “moribund,” may actually have survived. Second,
Justice Gorsuch’s ostensibly strict judgment-based approach arguably
called for providing relief in Edwards. Third, majority coalitions have a
counterintuitive incentive, rooted in rhetoric, to overrule relatively
insignificant precedents. Fourth, Edwards featured charges of personal
inconsistency that both reflect and facilitate the erosion of conventional
legal argument. Finally, the legal system may benefit from the superficial
and even fallacious reasoning often present in judicial decisions,
including excellent ones.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial reason and rhetoric should be mutually reinforcing, but
they often end up at odds. A decision’s reasoning can point toward
conclusions that are inconsistent with its rhetoric. And efforts at
rhetoric can undermine the quality, or even the appeal, of legal
reasoning.1 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Edwards v. Vannoy
offers an unusually rich oportunity to explore this set of tensions and
tradeoffs. Both the Court and the dissent explicitly discussed
“rhetoric,” for quite different purposes.2 And the results will shape both
habeas corpus and the law of precedent.
In brief, Edwards issued two holdings. First, it held that the juryunanimity right previously recognized in Ramos v. Louisiana is not a
“watershed” rule of criminal procedure and so cannot justify habeas
corpus relief for criminal defendants whose convictions are already
final.3 Second, the Court held that the entire concept of watershed
rules, though purportedly a staple of the Court’s habeas jurisprudence
for decades, had become “moribund.”4 As to both points, Justice Kagan
1. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021). By “reason,” I mean considerations that
support correct legal conclusions; and by “rhetoric,” I mean efforts to persuade. For trenchant
criticism of judicial opinions that aim at rhetoric, see Nina Varsava, Professional Irresponsibility
and Judicial Opinions, 59 HOUS. L. REV. 103 (2021) (“People might be more persuaded by an
artful opinion that masks legal reasons behind evocative narratives and pleasing rhetorical
flourishes.”).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 126 and 144. It is rare for the justices to discuss their
own rhetoric at all, much less argue about it.
3. See 141 S. Ct. 1547; Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). “Watershed” rules of
criminal procedure are an exception to the normal rule, established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 311 (plurality opinion), that new rules aren’t retroactively applicable in habeas corpus
proceedings.
4. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1560.
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vehemently dissented for herself and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.5
Meanwhile, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, endorsed what
purported to be a radical curtailing of habeas relief, based on historical
practices.6
This essay critically discusses Edwards to advance several claims
relating to the Court’s use of reason and rhetoric. First, the watershed
concept, though declared “moribund,” may actually have survived.
Second, Justice Gorsuch’s ostensibly strict judgment-based approach to
habeas corpus arguably called for relief in Edwards. Third, majority
coalitions at the Court have a counterintuitive incentive, rooted in
rhetoric, to overrule relatively insignificant precedents as often as
possible. Fourth, charges of personal inconsistency among the justices
both reflect and facilitate the erosion of conventional precedential
argument. Finally, the legal system may benefit from the superficial and
even fallacious reasoning that characterizes judicial opinions, including
excellent ones.
Along the way, the essay also discusses Edwards’s apparent use of
remedial equilibration, its procedural irregularities, and its defensible if
unfamiliar approach to stare decisis. The topic of reason and rhetoric
lends itself to self-criticism, and the essay finds some time for that as
well.
I. DID RAMOS RECOGNIZE A “WATERSHED” RULE?
While new rules of criminal procedure generally don’t apply
retroactively in habeas corpus proceedings, the Supreme Court has
long noted an exception for “watershed” rules.7 In Edwards, the Court
splintered on whether Ramos’s jury-unanimity rule qualified as a
watershed rule, yet the justices had surprisingly little to say about what
the watershed exception means. I accordingly begin by showing that
neither the Edwards majority nor the dissent came close to offering a
satisfying account of what a watershed is, much less whether the rule at
issue in Edwards should qualify.
I then propose two contrasting first-principled approaches to this
issue, one grounded in pragmatism and the other in the formal law of
5. See id. at 1573 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
6. Justice Thomas also wrote a concurrence on a related set of issues, namely the
relationship between Teague and AEDPA deference. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas,
J., concurring). I postpone thorough treatment of that opinion for another day, though it briefly
comes up once or twice below. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
7. See Teague, 489 U. S. at 311 (plurality opinion).
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judgments. The pragmatic account indicates that Edwards was a close
case on account of a yawning empirical uncertainty. And the more
formalist account suggests not only that Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence
actually preserved a kind of watershed exception, but also that the juryunanimity right might have qualified.
A. The Court and Dissent Have No Theory of Watersheds
In a case about the watershed exception, you might expect
considerable discussion of what the exception is. What is the point of
the exception? What would satisfy it? How could we describe its
content? Remarkably, however, these basic questions aren’t directly
addressed by either of the decision’s dueling opinions. I will return to
the reasons for this omission later. For now, let’s explore what the
opinions do say about the watershed exception.
For its part, Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion focused on what
we don’t know. The watershed exception, we learn, applies “only when,
among other things, the new rule alters ‘our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding.’”8 That description is avowedly incomplete and quite
vague. Confirming as much, the Court immediately noted that “those
various adjectives—watershed, narrow, bedrock, essential—do not tell
us much about whether a particular decision of this Court qualifies for
the watershed exception.”9
But instead of giving more definite content to the watershed idea,
the Court pivoted to describing things held not to be watersheds. While
appearing to accept that Gideon established a watershed,10 the Court
pointed to three non-watershed rules that “fundamentally reshaped
criminal procedure throughout the United States and significantly
expanded the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.”11 In the
Court’s view, there is simply “no good rationale for treating Ramos
differently.”12 Some commentators shared that intuition,13 but the

8. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1557 (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2007))
(emphasis added).
9. Id.
10. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1557 (“The Court has identified only one pre-Teague
procedural rule as watershed: the right to counsel recognized in the Court’s landmark decision in
Gideon . . . .” (citations omitted)).
11. Id. at 1559.
12. Id.
13. See e.g., Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (Dec. 2, 2020) (“If Ring, Crawford,
and Padilla aren’t ‘watershed’ rules, it’s hard to see how Ramos could be.”).
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Court never explained why it is true. What traits would a Gideon-like
watershed possess that the jury-unanimity rule doesn’t? And, just what
do the relevant precedents teach us about the content of the watershed
exception? In declining to answer those questions, the Court effectively
left the matter to a “you know it when you see it” test. The majority is
thus vulnerable to critics who assert different intuitions, as well as to
proponents of first-principles theories that can tell us what watersheds
are.
Justice Kagan’s dissent, too, said precious little about what
watersheds are, despite having the burden of showing that the
exception applied. The dissent’s most specific statement is the
following: “a new rule, to qualify as watershed, must be ‘essential to
[the trial’s] fairness’ [and] it must go to the defendant’s guilt or
innocence, ‘prevent[ing] an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate
conviction.’”14 But what is “essential” to “fairness” or qualifies as “an
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction”? The dissent
never directly answered that basic follow-up question.
Instead, the dissent presented a list of checked-off factors. Here is
the relevant passage, presented as a literal checklist:
 Start with history. The ancient foundations of the
unanimous jury rule? Check.
 The inclusion of that rule in the Sixth Amendment’s original
meaning? Check.
 Now go to function. The fundamental (or bedrock or
central) role of the unanimous jury in the American system
of criminal justice? Check.
 The way unanimity figures in ensuring fairness in criminal
trials and protecting against wrongful guilty verdicts?
Check.
 The link between those purposes and safeguarding the jury
system from (past and present) racial prejudice? Check.
In sum: As to every feature of the unanimity rule conceivably
relevant to watershed status, Ramos has already given the answer—
check, check, check—and today’s majority can say nothing to the
contrary.15

14. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1575 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 418 (2007)).
15. Id. at 1578 (edited for presentation in a checklist format).
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Unfortunately, the dissent offered no reason to think that this is
the right checklist. The list itself is entirely unprecedented.16 And the
dissent never explained why the checklist lines up with the purposes of
the watershed exception.
Instead, the dissent claimed that the jury-unanimity rule possesses
“every feature . . . conceivably relevant to watershed status.”17 Yet that
is plainly not the case. To give just one example,18 the Court has
suggested that watershed status could turn on whether the rule in
question instigated a widespread change in practice.19 That the Court
chose to undertake such a sweeping change could evidence the rule’s
importance—much as the dissent claimed that Ramos’s importance is
evidenced by the fact that it overruled precedent.20 And, if the Court
required that feature, Ramos would flunk.21
The dissent’s checklist can also be criticized for being too long. An
originalist might react to Kagan’s list by asserting that only the first two
factors bearing on “history” are relevant.22 By contrast, a pragmatist
might care only about the factors pertaining to “function.” Yet either
of those possibilities threatens the dissent’s conclusion, since the

16. The dissent asserted that “the jury unanimity requirement fits to a tee Teague’s
description of a watershed procedural rule.” Id. at 1574; see also id. at 1581 (positing an “airtight
match between Ramos and Teague”). But “Teague’s description” is actually quite vague and, in
any event, does not resemble the dissent’s checklist. See supra text accompanying note 8.
17. See id. at 1578.
18. As we will see, the briefing in Edwards identified another important item omitted from
the dissent’s checklist: ease or efficiency of implementation. See infra note 35 and accompanying
text.
19. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1559 (emphasizing that even non-watershed rules
“fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the United States”); Whorton, 549 U.S.
at 421 (positing that watershed rules must be “sweeping” in terms of the cases affected (internal
quotations omitted)); see also United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 2000)
(concluding that a watershed “must be a groundbreaking occurrence, a sweeping change that
applies to large swathe of cases” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 76, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021) (No. 19–5807) (similar).
20. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1575 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The first clue that the unanimity
rule falls within Teague’s small core is that the Court thought its adoption justified overturning
precedent.”).
21. Ramos v. Louisiana affected convictions in only two states (~2.7 percent of U.S.
population), one of which had already eliminated non-unanimous juries on a prospective basis.
140 S. Ct. 1390, 1407–08 (2020) (plurality opinion). By comparison, some non-watershed rules
affected many or most states. And Gideon prospectively affected at least five states. See Justin
Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 939 (2014) (viewing Gideon as an
“outliers” case). Gideon also helped foster ineffective assistance of counsel litigation, which
remains prevalent today.
22. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1572 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“it’s hard to see how rights
originally memorialized in the Constitution could fail to qualify” as “fundamental” enough to be
watersheds).
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majority points to cases where no watershed was found despite the
presence of those factors. To wit, Crawford v. Washington had history
on its side, and Batson v. Kentucky raised similar functionalist
considerations.23 Yet neither made the grade.24 Again, the dissent lacks
resources to address these challenges because it offers no affirmative
account of what a watershed rule is.
Apart from whether it contains too few or too many factors, the
dissent’s checklist is also qualitatively flawed. The dissent assumes that
each “checked” factor is a binary trait. Yet the listed factors are actually
matters of degree, raising the possibility that the jury-unanimity right
insufficiently presents them. To wit, Kagan recognized at oral argument
that whether a right “protect[s] against wrongful guilty verdicts” can be
true to varying extents—and that the evidence with respect to jury
unanimity was “sparse.”25 Ramos itself had made substantially the
same point.26 So the dissent’s fourth “checked” item probably needs an
asterisk.
Or take the last factor, which asks whether there is a “link between
[the right’s] purposes and safeguarding the jury system from (past and
present) racial prejudice.”27 Is it enough for there to be a “link,” yes or
no? One might think it relevant whether there is a close link. And once
that possibility arises, the dissent’s checklist again becomes inadequate.
Here, too, Batson looms large: it directly struck at racially invidious
peremptory strikes,28 whereas Ramos banned a practice that can often
be non-discriminatory.29 But despite the Court’s emphasis on Batson,
the dissent mentions it only once—when summarizing the majority.30
The dissent thus offers no persuasive basis for its conclusion that if
Ramos’s rule “isn’t a watershed one, then nothing is.”31 We can easily
23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (adopting a historically oriented
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing
a procedure for challenging racially invidious peremptory strikes in jury selection).
24. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986); Whorton, 549 U.S. 406.
25. See Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 19 at 18–19. .
26. See, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1401 (“[W]ho can say whether any particular hung jury is
a waste . . . ?”); see also infra notes 38 & 140.
27. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1578 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
28. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
29. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1427 (Alito, J., dissenting) (collecting jurisdictions and
organizations that have supported non-unanimous juries for race-neutral reasons). Kagan joined
most of the foregoing opinion.
30. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1579 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The dissent masterfully keeps
attention away from its greatest vulnerabilities (e.g., Batson) while drawing out the Court’s
problematic personal attack. See infra Section IV.D.
31. See Id. at 1576.
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imagine many plausible accounts of the watershed exception that
would include some rules and exclude Ramos.
B. Teague as Cost-Benefit Analysis
If the justices didn’t offer a satisfactory account of the watershed
exception, can we do better? This Section offers a pragmatic account
and suggests that Edwards posed a far harder case than either the
majority or the dissent let on.
The foundational assumption here is that the watershed exception
is supposed to allow for collateral relief that is sufficiently beneficial on
net, where the main competing interests are: (i) the state’s interest in
finality and (ii) defendants’ interest in avoiding erroneous or otherwise
unfair convictions.32 In other words, retroactive application of a
procedural right must pay its way by helping wrongfully convicted
defendants more than it unsettles justified convictions.33 Apart from
having intuitive appeal, the foregoing cost-benefit analysis is arguably
what Teague itself described as the basis for the watershed exception.34
Given that pragmatic approach, the unanimous jury rule can be
viewed as unusual, even unique. In short, we can easily identify a large
set of cases where the right’s violation seems consequential—namely,
the set of cases where there was a non-unanimous verdict of conviction.
The jury’s divided vote, say, 11-1 or 10-2 in favor of conviction, is a
powerful and easily ascertainable signal that the jury’s voting rule
mattered.35 Moreover, it seems reasonable to presume that the holdout
jurors are often trying to protect innocent or otherwise unjustly
32. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310–13 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Susan
Bandes, Taking Justice to its Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2453, 2456 (1993). For an alternative approach, see Jeffrey G. Ho, Finality, Comity, and
Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure: Reimagining the Teague Doctrine After Edwards v. Vannoy,
Note, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (2021).
33. One issue here is whether Teague is concerned not only with protecting legal innocence,
but also with all unwarranted or unfair convictions. Historically, holdout jurors were thought to
be just as important for their ability to protect people who were legally guilty but unjustly
prosecuted. See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside
the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1998). And debates about jury nullification persist,
including in connection with racial justice. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
34. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310–13 (plurality opinion). This approach must still weigh
potential incommensurables. But it is plausible that retroactive relief is beneficial when nearly all
affected convictions are wrongful.
35. See Amicus Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., in Support of
Petitioner, at 10–13, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021) (No. 19–58070). This point
resembles harmless error: the jury-unanimity right would be retroactive only as to violations that
seemed harmful.
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prosecuted defendants. The basic assumption of the unanimous jury
right, after all, is that a holdout juror is no quirky worrywart, but rather
a telltale indication that a conviction is unwarranted.36
The claim here is that the jury-unanimity rule is special, not because
it is unusually important, but because it is unusually easy to implement
through habeas. By comparison, retroactively implementing (for
instance) the Batson right would require speculation about how struck
jurors would have voted, had they been impaneled. The cost-benefit
argument for Ramos’s retroactivity is thus entirely compatible with the
Court’s conclusion that Ramos is no more important than any number
of other “momentous” decisions.37 The point is that the unanimous jury
right allows for targeted, high-yield relief. And if the relief is nearly
perfectly targeted—essentially disrupting only erroneous or unfair
convictions—then the results of the cost-benefit analysis would
presumably be clear.
Still, the cost-benefit analysis has its own problems. As Ramos
noted, a demand for jury unanimity could simply mean that many
divided verdicts will turn into unanimous convictions.38 And it is a
staple of criminal practice that initially conflicted juries are urged to
think again, ultimately arriving at a consensus finding of guilt. The
signal afforded by split verdicts could therefore be viewed as noisy,
raising the costs of retroactive application. Justice Kagan
acknowledged this sort of problem at oral argument:
I’ll just give you my sense that the empirics here are sparse,
maybe surprisingly sparse, as to how this unanimity
requirement works with respect to what I take to be the
ordinary meaning of ‘accuracy,’ which is simply a reduction in
the error rate in trials. . . . [I]t might be that the unanimity rule
allows more guilty people to go free than it – than it stops
innocent people from being convicted, or at least it’s just not
certain.39

Kagan’s candid observation reveals a difficulty engendered by a
cost-benefit approach to the watershed exception and, perhaps, many
similar doctrines. When a habeas case comes to the Court, there will
36. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
37. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1559.
38. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1401–02 & n.45 (2020) (“some studies suggest
that the elimination of unanimity has only a small effect on the rate of hung juries”); see generally
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1272–73
(2000).
39. See Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 19 at 18–19.
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often be unclear or insufficient evidence of what the key consequences
might be. And because serious empirical research can take years, or
yield results that vary by context, delaying a decision might not produce
much better evidence.
How should judges manage this uncertainty? Some jurists might
want to place a burden of proof on the claimant, thereby ensuring
defeat for Edwards and all similar defendants. Others might err on the
side of claimants, who after all can hardly be faulted for not having
conducted peer-reviewed studies. Either way, the cost-benefit approach
would ultimately turn on something other than a genuine tabulation of
costs and benefits.
C. Gorsuch’s Judgment-based Approach
Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion staked out an alternative,
formalist approach.40 Judged by its rhetoric, the concurrence proposed
a radical narrowing of habeas doctrine that goes far beyond the
majority’s apparent decision to retire the watershed exception.
Remarkably, however, Gorsuch’s reasoning suggests not only that a
type of watershed exception should survive but also that the exception
should have applied in Edwards.
Gorsuch’s basic goal is to return habeas practice to something
closer to what it was in the early twentieth century (or before).41 In that
era, habeas review generally ceased if a warden could show that he held
the claimant pursuant to a valid judgment of conviction. Consequently,
habeas practice focused on a salient way to attack preclusive
judgments—namely, by showing that the convicting court lacked
jurisdiction.42 In a footnote, however, Gorsuch reserved whether
“substantive rules, which place certain conduct ‘beyond the power of
the criminal law-making authority to prescribe,’” might fit within “the
jurisdictional exception to the finality rule.”43
40. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1566, 1571 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Paul M. Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441,
446–48 (1963)). For a dynamic account of habeas that challenges Bator’s conclusions, see Ann
Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
41. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1570 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“returning the Great Writ to
its historical office”).
42. See id. at 1567. Historically, “jurisdiction” here may have been a legal fiction allowing
for some merits-based relief. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Habeas, History, and Hermeneutics, 64 ARIZ.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
43. See id. at 1571 n.6 (citations omitted). In addition, Gorsuch appears to view “a state
court’s extreme departure from ‘established modes’ of criminal trial practice, such as proceeding
under the specter of mob violence,” as “akin to the loss of ‘jurisdiction.’” Id. at 1568. He thus
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Surprisingly, Gorsuch’s theory seems to require something like the
watershed exception. Again, the exception purports to define a set of
“procedural” rules that apply retroactively in habeas.44 And Gorsuch
joined the Court’s apparent disavowal of such rules.45 But Gorsuch also
argues that jurisdictional defects are remediable in habeas—and such
defects are generally regarded as procedural. We might therefore
imagine a new rule as to when criminal courts have jurisdiction. In fact,
Gorsuch himself recently authored just such a decision in McGirt v.
Oklahoma, which constricted state criminal jurisdiction.46 Under
Gorsuch’s view of habeas, shouldn’t the McGirt rule, and other
jurisdictional rules like it, be not only procedural but also retroactively
applicable? If so, his opinion doesn’t eliminate the watershed exception
so much as specify its content.
Further, Gorsuch’s reasoning suggests that he is wrong to place so
much emphasis on jurisdictional defects. Again, the reason for caring
about such a defect, both historically and on Gorsuch’s account, is that
a judgment without jurisdiction is no judgment at all—and thus no
answer to a claim for habeas relief. But jurisdictional defects are just
one way in which judgments can be inadequate.47 Imagine that the
judgment pertains to a different person, for instance. Surely a warden
can’t defeat a habeas claim by showing that other people are being held
pursuant to a valid judgment. As that example illustrates, the real
touchstone for Gorsuch must, or should, be whether a preclusive
judgment supports the detention.
Gorsuch indicates openness to that revised view through his
reservation for “substantive rules.” If the defendant’s judgment of
conviction is for something that is not a crime at all, then the judgment
itself seems defective. At an extreme, we might imagine a judgment of
conviction saying that “John Smith is guilty of thinking and so is
sentenced to a prison term.” Because there is no crime of “thinking,”
and presumably could not be such a crime under the Constitution, that
judgment would be facially defective, or simply a legal nullity. If that

deems Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), only a “modest” innovation. If this “extreme
departure” exception abides for Gorsuch, then it too might create room for watershed rules—and
for awarding Edwards relief.
44. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion).
45. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1572 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
46. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
47. Bator, too, invoked the law of judgments. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 461 (1963) (citing
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942)); see also infra note 48.
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much is right, it likely follows that a conviction for an unconstitutional
offense is similarly ineffective. An unconstitutional law, after all, is
generally treated as no law at all.48
But if Gorsuch’s theory really ought to be focused on all judgment
defects, not just jurisdiction, then why didn’t he vote to award relief to
Edwards? The rule recognized in Ramos, after all, is directly relevant
to the defendant’s judgment of guilt. What indeed is a criminal
judgment in a jury case, other than a report of what a properly
constituted jury decided? Again, an extreme example can help clarify
the issue: imagine a judgment of guilt that reported a verdict issued by
a council of dragons. That would not be a valid judgment under the
Constitution of the United States. To be constitutional, the conviction
would have to report on a jury, legally defined.49 And, under Ramos,
that means a unanimous jury (of humans).50 Further, Gorsuch’s opinion
for the Court in Ramos specifically grounded that conclusion in
historical practice: “A verdict, taken from eleven, was no verdict at
all.”51 So Edwards’s judgment of conviction is arguably defective,
perhaps even on its face.52
And what about the other Teague exception? Apart from the
watershed exception, Teague allows for retroactive application of
substantive rules.53 That additional exception has flourished in recent
years.54 Yet Gorsuch’s reservation might not fully encompass it. Under
the substantive-rule exception, the Court retroactively applies new
rules that narrow criminal liability. Gorsuch, however, expressly

48. This was the logic of Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), which Gorsuch cites. See also
Bator, supra note 47, at 471–73 (“a judgment under [an unconstitutional] statute . . . has a
nonexistent quality, as if there were no competence in the premises at all”). Still, at least some
remedial doctrines are concerned with unconstitutional laws. E.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
617–18 (1999) (qualified immunity); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule).
49. There can, of course, be waivers of jury-trial rights.
50. This argument suggests that the jury-trial right itself should have been applied
retroactively in habeas, contrary to DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam). But
DeStefano predates Teague. At any rate, Gorsuch is plainly prepared to reject wrongheaded
Warren Court precedents.
51. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Edwards dissent powerfully both opened and concluded with this line from Ramos but didn’t tie
it to Gorsuch’s judgment-based approach.
52. See Joint Appendix at 26–39, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021) (No. 19-580)
(transcript showing the divided jury vote at entry of conviction).
53. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310–13 (1989) (plurality opinion).
54. E.g., Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016); see generally Leah M. Litman, Legal
Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417 (2018).
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reserved only convictions based on unconstitutional statutes.55 Thus,
Gorsuch’s approach could preclude relief when a prohibition is
partially struck down or narrowed in scope through interpretation.56 So
it seems that Gorsuch has set himself not just against the watershed
exception, but also against important aspects of the other, livelier
Teague exception.
Yet here, too, Gorsuch’s reasoning suggests a more complicated
answer. It turns out that there is another relevant way of challenging a
judgment’s preclusive effect—namely, changes based on intervening
law.57 Gorsuch himself recently joined a decision vigorously applying
this exception to overcome issue preclusion in a civil case, even though
the change in the law fell short of an express overruling.58 The logic of
that exception would seem to apply a fortiori to new rules that
explicitly narrow criminal liability.59 So Gorsuch’s reservation may be
stated too narrowly for the theory it accompanies.
Stepping back, it’s striking that Gorsuch’s opinion didn’t explore
the possibility that his historically grounded, judgment-based approach
might have called for granting Edwards relief. In declaring that the
“‘watershed’ exception for new rules of criminal procedure is no
exception at all”,60 Gorsuch was satisfied with debunking the existing
doctrinal framework without fully developing his own. Nor did
Gorsuch consider that his judgment-based theory might supply a way
of overcoming, or circumventing, AEDPA’s bar on review of claims
“adjudicated on the merits in State court.”61 So while Gorsuch deserves
praise for advancing a theory of what the case was about, he failed to
dwell on that theory long enough to resolve the case at hand. We can

55. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1571 n.6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
56. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
57. See Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).
58. See id. at 1697 (“Even when the elements of issue preclusion are met, however, an
exception may be warranted if there has been an intervening ‘change in [the] applicable legal
context.’” (quoting Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 834 (2009) (in turn quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28, cmt. c (1980))).
59. “The change-in-law exception recognizes that applying issue preclusion in changed
circumstances may not ‘advance the equitable administration of the law.’” Id. (citation omitted).
60. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1573 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
61. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). Justice Thomas’s separate concurrence, which Gorsuch joined, argued that
§ 2254(d)(1) generally precludes relief in cases like Edwards, regardless of Teague. See Edwards,
140 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring). But a judgment that is extra-jurisdictional or otherwise
defective seemingly cannot render a claim “adjudicated” at all. Cf. Lee Kovarsky, Preclusion and
Criminal Judgment, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 637, 638 (2016) (arguing that “a state criminal
judgment is now more preclusive than is its civil counterpart”).
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only hope that, in declaring that he plans to be “guided as nearly as
[possible] by the principles set forth herein,”62 Gorsuch left room for
later filling-in—even if that work proves too late for Edwards and
defendants like him.
Gorsuch’s revisionism illustrates a broader problem in
contemporary jurisprudence. As formalist approaches to law have risen
in prominence, judges are increasingly troubled by the doctrinal
frameworks established in prior eras. One option is simply to throw out
all the old decisions and eagerly start afresh, from formalist first
principles. Gorsuch’s Edwards concurrence exemplifies that approach.
But, as Gorsuch has elsewhere remarked, we should not “clear away a
fence just because we cannot see its point.”63 Likewise, a doctrine that
today seems like errant functionalism could originally have come about
at least in part through formalist reasoning. Overzealous revisionism
can thus recreate long-solved problems—and ultimately require judges
to reconstruct the same doctrinal edifices they themselves had too
hastily torn down.
Finally, one might either defend or criticize Gorsuch’s opinion on
procedural grounds. After all, no party or even amicus had prompted
Gorsuch to address the points above, including whether a judgmentbased theory might have supported Edwards far more strongly than the
governing doctrinal framework. But Gorsuch’s theory came utterly
without warning, leaving the parties no particular reason to attend to
it. So perhaps the lack of briefing on the topic is another ground for
criticism. And, it turns out, Gorsuch isn’t alone in being subject to that
sort of procedural objection.
II. WAS THE COURT’S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ILLEGITIMATE?
Substance is sometimes revealed procedurally. This Part argues that
troubling aspects of Edwards’s decision-making process shed light on
how the Court resolved the questions presented. In particular, the
Court in both Ramos and Edwards was likely engaged in remedial
equilibration.

62. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1573 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Gorsuch did not explain how
to reconcile this promise with stare decisis.
63. See Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(referencing Chesterton). Revisionist formalism can be modest—and more in the vein of
rediscovery than critique.
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A. Edwards’s Procedural Problems
The argument so far underscores a set of procedural objections to
Edwards. As we’ve seen, the case raised pragmatic issues in need of
empirical clarification, and Gorsuch’s formalist theory called for
greater analytic development. A natural response to both of these
shortfalls is to urge the Court to bide its time even more than usual, so
as to allow greater research and ventilation of the relevant issues. Yet
the Court did quite the opposite.
In fact, Edwards was doubly precipitous, as compared with normal
process. First, the Court granted certiorari over a petition that did not
pose a retroactivity issue at all.64 Evidently, the Court followed that
anomalous approach because it wanted to resolve Ramos’s
retroactivity right away, based on an already pending petition. Needless
to say, that approach short-circuited the normal process of percolation
in lower courts.65
Second, the Court dispatched the watershed exception despite the
fact that no party ever requested that the Court do so.66 Even more than
the first, this second break from normal practice deprived the Court of
thorough adversarial presentation on critical issues. The dissent leveled
substantially this critique by pointing out that “no one here had a
chance to make” arguments against overruling.67
I find these procedural objections persuasive, partly because I view
the watershed issue in Edwards as difficult. But it is worth asking
whether anything might justify, or render less objectionable, the Court’s
blatantly anomalous way of handling this case.
B. Did the Court Engage in Remedial Equilibration?
The most charitable construal of events, I think, is that the Court’s
decisions in both Ramos and Edwards were guided, at every level, by a
desire for remedial equilibration.
In brief, remedial equilibration is the idea that rights and remedies
are to be considered in tandem, so as to achieve an optimal balance of
64. Compare Grant of Certiorari, Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19–5807 (granting certiorari
limited to the retroactivity issue); with Petition for Certiorari, No. 19–5807, at ii (raising only the
question of whether the Constitution requires jury unanimity in some cases).
65. For doubts on percolation’s usefulness, see Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Percolation’s
Value, 73 STAN. L. REV. 363 (2021).
66. Appearing as amicus, even the United States declined to make that request. See Tr. of
Oral Argument at, supra note 19 at 75..
67. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1581 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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the two.68 One implication of this approach is that rights expansions
might be justified if, or because, they will be tempered by remedial
retrenchment. The opposing view, sometimes called rights essentialism,
is that questions of rights and remedies are strictly distinct, such that a
change with respect to one has no direct effect on the other.69 Both
approaches find considerable support among jurists and scholars alike,
with remedial equilibration often associated with functionalists and
rights essentialism with formalists.
But even formalists should respect the case for remedial
equilibration in connection with Ramos and Edwards. That is because
the formal doctrines at play seemed to stitch the two decisions together.
In Ramos, the Court had to consider whether to overturn precedent,
making reliance and other pragmatic factors highly pertinent.70 And the
biggest, perhaps even the only cognizable, reliance interest at stake in
Ramos had to do with the question posed in Edwards—namely,
whether states that had relied on the Court’s earlier decisions would
have to retry long-convicted defendants.71 So whether the juryunanimity right would apply retroactively (the Edwards question) was
legally central to deciding whether to recognize that right at all (the
Ramos question).
Moreover, Edwards came close to endorsing remedial equilibration
in so many words. As part of a remarkable exchange with the dissent
(more on that to come), the Court offered the following defense of its
decision to find Ramos nonretroactive:
[T]he dissent asserts that the Court is not living up to the
promise of Ramos for criminal defendants. . . . To properly
assess the implications for criminal defendants, one should
assess the implications of Ramos and today’s ruling together.72

This passage demonstrates that at least some justices saw a tight
relationship between Ramos’s decision to recognize a right and
Edwards’s decision not to allow for retroactive remediation of that
right in habeas.

68. See generally Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
69. See id. at 858.
70. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405–08 (opinion of the Court and plurality opinion).
71. See id. at 1407 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the watershed inquiry is “expressly
calibrated to address the reliance interests States have in the finality of their criminal judgments”).
72. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1562 (small caps omitted).
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C. Might the Watershed Exception Have Survived?
Viewing Edwards in terms of remedial equilibration recasts every
important feature of that decision, from its timing to its outcome.
Start with the Court’s evident rush to grant cert on the retroactivity
issue, despite its not being properly presented. If the two issues were
effectively merged, as remedial equilibration would suggest, then
retroactivity must have been all but decided at the same time that
Ramos chose to overrule precedent. And there is evidence that some
justices in Ramos in fact held that view, with Kavanaugh in particular
volunteering an early answer to the retroactivity issue.73 That the Court
didn’t decide against Ramos’s retroactivity in Ramos itself might then
be taken as a sop to normal practice or, perhaps, as a courtesy to
members of the Ramos majority—such as Breyer and Sotomayor—
who may not have been equilibrating.74
For another thing, the remedial equilibration framing supplies a
new way of understanding the Court’s uninvited decision to close off
the watershed exception. If equilibration is the order of the day, then
the question of retroactivity should be decided in tandem with the
recognition of new procedural rules. Thus, there is no reason for lower
courts to ask whether to apply new procedural rules retroactively. The
Court itself would already have answered that question when it
identified the rules in the first place. As Edwards put it: “Ramos itself
explicitly forecast today’s decision.”75 So Edwards can be viewed as an
elaboration on what Ramos had already decided.
But if the decision to phase out the watershed exception actually
has to do with the who and the when of deciding watershed issues, then
the exception might one day come out of retirement. Imagine a new
rule entitling criminal defendants to access a state-operated Perfect Lie
Detector.76 That rule would be at least as valuable as the one adopted
in Gideon, which Edwards accepted as a watershed rule.77 So, if it
eventually recognizes a new right of sufficient import, the Court might
just find a watershed, too. Or it might not. The point is that the

73. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1420 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (expressly incorporating the
watershed inquiry into the stare decisis analysis).
74. Justices Breyer and Sotomayor concurred in Ramos and then dissented in Edwards,
yielding no evidence they engaged in remedial equilibration.
75. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1561.
76. We might imagine a rule entitling certain defendants access to DNA testing or to a brainimaging system capable of corroborating testimony.
77. See supra note 10.
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watershed exception would have survived as a legal category. Stare
decisis would not preclude its future use.
Supporting that view, the Court’s rejection of the watershed
exception could largely be viewed as an elaborate dictum. While
holdings in the alternative are traditionally viewed as precedential,78
the majority’s claim that the watershed exception is “moribund” wasn’t
just unnecessary—it was explicitly parasitic on the Court’s prior
conclusion that the unanimous-jury rule didn’t qualify as a watershed.79
Thus, the Court’s broader conclusion wasn’t really “in the alternative”
so much as “in addition to.”
Further, the Court’s conclusion is somewhat ambiguous. In stating
that “[n]ew procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal
collateral review,” the Court may have been describing a present,
contingent reality, not a permanent truth.80 The former reading makes
more sense of the Court’s apparent recognition that Gideon
established a genuine watershed rule, and we will see below that it also
aligns with Edwards’s approach to stare decisis.81
One might fairly respond that the decision’s rhetoric offers surer
evidence of what this Court intends to do.82 After all, the Court’s tone
in Edwards, and some of its discrete statements, evince a desire to
eliminate watersheds once and for all. But stare decisis might properly
track judicial reasoning, rather than predictive rhetoric.83 In the
absence of a clear holding to the contrary, the option to find a
watershed remains legally available to future justices.
So perhaps Edwards didn’t really alter all that much. Both before
and after that decision, the justices were unlikely to find watershed
rules.84 Edwards’s main innovation had to do with what the justices

78. See Hitchcock v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 745 F.3d 476, 485 n.3 (11th Cir. 2014)
(collecting sources).
79. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1559 (asking: if many landmark rulings “and now Ramos” do
not apply retroactively, how can any?).
80. Id. at 1560 (emphasis added).
81. See supra note 10 (on Gideon); infra Section III.B. (on precedent).
82. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 799 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (making a
similar claim).
83. On whether precedent is (or should be) a predictive exercise, in which case rhetoric
might dominate, or a more formal, reason-based practice, compare John M. Rogers, “Issue
Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 997, 1007–09 (1996), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996).
84. Still, Edwards has reduced any in terrorem effect that watersheds might have had for
lower courts. See Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Constitutional Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure, 91
WASH. L. REV. 463 (2016).
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could “responsibly continue to suggest . . . to litigants and courts.”85 In
essence, the Court’s new message is: Don’t call us; we’ll call you. The
statement that the watershed exception is “moribund” thus operates
more as a vertical instruction to the lower courts than as a horizontal
constraint on the justices themselves.
The bottom line is that Edwards might not be quite so final about
finality. Rather, the Court played fast and loose with the normal process
of review for the sake of remedial equilibration. And by declaring the
watershed exception defunct, the Court simply relieved the lower
courts of having to spend time on an unlikely possibility that the Court
had decided to handle all by itself.86
III. DID EDWARDS VIOLATE STARE DECISIS?
The Edwards dissent took the majority to task for “overruling” the
watershed exception.87 But there is good reason to think that the
majority’s reasoning, though elliptical, satisfied the demands of stare
decisis.
A. Was the Watershed Exception Even Precedential?
Was the watershed exception ever really a holding at all, as opposed
to a dictum or some other lesser form of precedent?
On the one hand, the Court has said many times that there might
be watershed decisions of criminal procedure, and it has held that many
new rules fall short of meeting that standard.88 Those repeated
statements seem legally significant. They reflected the considered views
of at least some justices. And lower courts were right to heed them as a
matter of vertical precedent, for reasons of decisional efficiency and
uniformity, if nothing else.89
On the other hand, an unfulfilled statement of possibility, even if
part of the Court’s reasoning, seems more in the vein of a reservation
than a holding. Part of what makes precedent is a court’s willingness to
follow through on what it says—to rest a judgment on otherwise

85. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1559.
86. Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (2009).
87. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1574 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417 (2007); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S.
348, 352 (2004).
89. Cf. Jones v. St. Paul Co., 495 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2007) (bowing to Court “dicta”).
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academic reasoning.90 Because the watershed exception never passed
that test, it may not have earned the full support of stare decisis.
Viewing the watershed exception as never fully precedential helps
make sense of the Court’s curt treatment of it. As the dissent
complained, the Court devoted just two paragraphs to the issue of
whether the exception was defunct and never ticked through all the
traditional stare decisis factors.91 Still, perhaps the most important
factor—reliance—was mentioned and quickly dispatched: “no one can
reasonably rely on an exception that is non-existent in practice.”92 This
treatment reads like stare decisis lite.
B. Was the Exception Empirically Undermined?
Even if the watershed exception wasn’t fully precedential, it still
might make sense to give its fate a full hearing. The point of ticking
through all the factors—here and elsewhere—might not be to constrain
the Court or even persuade it to change course, but rather to clarify its
thought process in ways that it (and we) might not even anticipate.93
There is some reason to think such clarification would have been
helpful. True, the “workability” and “doctrinal outlier” factors seem
almost to have been implicitly addressed.94 But another traditional
factor calls for consideration of the quality of the prior decision’s
reasoning. And, as we have seen, the Court fell short on that score,
offering precious little about the reasons for recognizing the watershed
exception in the first place. Attending to this factor would have clarified
precisely where, in the Court’s view, Teague went awry in recognizing
the exception.
But perhaps we can connect the dots ourselves. On reflection, the
watershed doctrine has three component precepts: (i) a substantive
principle relating to new rules of criminal procedure bearing on
accuracy and fairness; (ii) an empirical view of the likelihood of such
90. On one traditional view, only judicial results are really precedential; the rules that judges
articulate are of lesser, or no, precedential value. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?,
10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (1941) (suggesting that no overruling takes place when past reasoning
is rejected without repudiating any result). And, on a pure results model, there would appear to
be no precedent for the existence of a watershed exception.
91. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1581 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 1551 (majority opinion).
93. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, An Epistemic Defense of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 63–66 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013).
94. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (listing
the four main stare decisis factors). In other words, the majority arguably showed the watershed
test to be both unworkable and an outlier because it was practically unmeetable.
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rules existing; and (iii) an implementation rule calling for courts to hear
watershed claims.95
The Court seems to have focused on the second of these
components. That is, the Court apparently concluded that watersheds
are like “the Tasmanian tiger,” possibly real but practically
unobservable.96 And, given that revised empirical assessment, informed
by over three decades of experience, the basis for the implementation
rule fell away.97 Even if the Tasmanian tiger really does exist out
there—somewhere—the search for it might be too costly, and too
improbable, to be worth carrying out.98 This assessment dovetails with
the remedial-equilibration account of Edwards described earlier.99 So,
again, perhaps the search for watershed rules hasn’t been declared
impossible so much as discontinued.
The upshot is that the core principle underlying the watershed
exception—the idea that procedural rules can be so integral to fairness
and accuracy as to justify retroactive application in habeas—remains
unrefuted. So, if the Court one day gets a bead on the Tasmanian tiger,
the search might recommence.
C. Overruling as a Fait Accompli
If you look closely, you can see that Edwards did apply a stare
decisis framework—just not the one that normally attends an
overruling. In its crescendo statement, the Court stated: “The
watershed exception is moribund. It must ‘be regarded as retaining no
vitality.’”100 The Court was quoting Herrera v. Wyoming, which resolved
a tension between two precedents as follows: “While [the first case]
‘was not expressly overruled’ in [the second one], ‘it must be regarded

95. On implementation rules, see RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION (2001); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9
(2004).
96. See Tr. of Oral Argument, supra 19 at 13–14 (remarks of Justice Alito).
97. Ironically, the best defense of the Court’s argument comes from the dissent. In a moment
of exasperation, the dissent declared that, if the jury-unanimity right “isn’t a watershed one, then
nothing is.” Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1576 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Now, the dissent was probably
engaged in a little hyperbole here; but if Ramos really did pose the strongest possible case for a
watershed and still came up short, then the Court would indeed seem justified in simply abolishing
the watershed exception.
98. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1561 (holding out a “false hope” only “wastes the resources
of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts”); see also id. at 1565 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“the
majority wisely closes a door to retroactive relief that likely never existed in the first place”).
99. See also supra Section II.C.
100. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1560 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
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as retaining no vitality’ after that decision.”101 The logic appears to be
that if one precedent implicitly overrules another, a still later precedent
can announce that fact as a fait accompli.
One might question Edwards’s invocation of Herrera on the
grounds that no particular decision drained the watershed exception’s
“vitality.”102 Rather, Edwards focused on “the Court’s many
retroactivity precedents taken together.”103 Yet a pattern of erosion or
evasion could be taken as better evidence of implicit overruling than
any single, potentially one-off decision. One might respond that the
past decisions actually showed that the watershed exception had been
repeatedly reaffirmed. But the cases are better viewed as harbingers of
the exception’s impending demise, with several explicitly speculating
that no watersheds were ever likely to be found.104
At any rate, both Herrera and Edwards raise the same fundamental
question: does the Court illegitimately evade stare decisis by declaring
that an overruling has already occurred, even though no prior decision
had so declared? As the dissent argued, the stare decisis analysis can be
regarded as “disciplining.”105 Yet that discipline is avoided through
overruling as a fait accompli. Surely, one might think, a stare decisis
analysis is called for at some point in a precedent’s demise. The
“retaining no vitality” line could even be viewed as a bad-faith strategy
for undermining precedent.
But here, too, the situation is more complicated. The problem with
fait accompli overrulings is especially severe if we imagine that the
earlier ruling was undertaken with the follow-through in mind. But it’s
possible, even likely, that the earlier ruling wanted to create a period of
precedential tension, rather than knowing precisely how things would
be resolved. If experience turned out to favor the later ruling over the
earlier one, then the case for overruling would have been made. And if
not, then not. The case for good faith grows still stronger if many
years—and judicial appointments—lie between the practical and
101. See Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1697 (2019) (quoting still earlier case law).
102. See Daniel B. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865,
893–94 (2019) (discussing Herrera and related cases while arguing that a single, decisive
repudiation of precedent is distinctive).
103. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1562.
104. See id. at 1555 (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417 (2007)); see also Kermit
Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the Supreme
Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What It Might, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1677, 1694 (2007) (“[N]o
new procedural rule has yet satisfied the Teague exception, and the Court has strongly intimated
that none shall.”).
105. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1581 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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formal overrulings.
We can better see both the appeal and the distinctiveness of fait
accompli overrulings by placing them in historical perspective. To a
great extent, these rulings harken back to an earlier era, when
precedential principles were not made but found. Today, lawyers often
assume that a case loses precedential value only if and when a courtas-legislature formally declares it to be repealed or “overruled.” But, at
common law, a judicial decision could be set aside for already being
odds with the custom or practice of the courts in general.106 Experience,
one might say, can gradually reveal a once venerable precedent’s
error.107 Similar logic may explain the Court’s recourse to “the court of
history” in disavowing Korematsu, even though that precedent had
never been formally overruled.108
All this to say that overruling by fait accompli, including in
Edwards, is at least plausible and possibly even preferable to legislative
overruling pursuant to the stare decisis factors. In general, showing that
a case has gone by the wayside is harder, calling for greater judicial
patience and humility, than simply running through a four-part, oneand-done rubric. So a pattern of erosion or evasion would seem to
qualify as a basis for overcoming stare decisis. To harmonize this
conclusion with extant doctrine, such a pattern might be treated as a
“special factor” within the stare decisis analysis.
D. Stare Decisis as Crying Wolf
Edwards surfaces important tension in the practice of precedentbased dissents, one that befuddles dissenters and counterintuitively
fosters efforts to overrule.
Imagine that you are a justice who generally hopes to protect
existing case law from erosion or repudiation. You might think it is a
good idea to complain about each and every instance of overruling, so
as to keep stare decisis salient and make the majority coalition pay an
ever-increasing “price” in professional and public esteem. But you
106. See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187,
1225–27 (2007).
107. See Charles Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625, 1636–37 (discussing
overruling based on experience).
108. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); see also Daniel B. Rice, Repugnant
Precedents and the Court of History, 121 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022). As we have seen,
Edwards’s disavowal of the watershed exception may itself have been dicta or otherwise “empty,”
as some critics have alleged with respect to Trump v. Hawaii’s repudiation of Korematsu. Cf.
Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J. F. 629 (2019).
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would also worry about coming across as Chicken Little, or the Boy
Who Cried Wolf. It isn’t always a big deal to overrule, even when doing
so is wrong. And, sometimes, overruling is positively the right thing to
do. Much as the Court would lose face by overruling too freely, as
though precedent were legally irrelevant, dissenters can sacrifice their
credibility by acting as though every new overruling is a fresh End of
Days. So, what’s a dissenter to do?
The most straightforward response would be to moderate through
selectivity. That is, the dissenter could make a big deal out of especially
outrageous overrulings, while toning it down when overrulings are less
consequential or unjustified. Dissenters surely avail themselves of this
option to some extent. Yet the costs of moderation are high, as it turns
overruling into an occasion for refined judgment, not automatic
skepticism. Fostering pervasive anger, or anxiety, about the threat to
stare decisis might seem critical to deterring the majority and
preventing at least some overrulings from happening at all. Frequent
dissenters therefore have good reason to see if they can have their
rhetorical cake and eat it, too.
One way of finessing that issue is to try and have it both ways in the
moment. This solution relates to an even broader dynamic that might
be termed the dissenter’s dilemma, that is, the dissenter’s desire
simultaneously to both fuel outrage over a decision’s potential reach
and to minimize the same decision’s actual consequences.109 In Jones v.
Mississippi, for instance, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent argued that the
Court was in effect “overturning Miller or Montgomery,” contrary to
stare decisis.110 But, later, the dissent also insisted that “sentencers
should hold this Court to its word: Miller and Montgomery are still
good law.”111 The problem with this approach is that the dissent might
come across as self-contradictory, or as overly strategic in how it spins
the Court’s treatment of case law.
Another way of squaring the rhetorical circle is to try and have it
109. I borrow this term from related discussion in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 21, 28–
30 (1957); see also United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.)
(“Cassandra-like predictions in dissent are not a sure guide to the breadth of the majority’s
ruling . . . .”). Cf. Oren Tamir, Political Stare Decisis, 22 CHI. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2022)
(discussing the risk of being a “sore loser” in the context of political precedent).
110. 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1336 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (referring to Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)); see also id. at 1337
(“Now, it seems, the Court is willing to overrule precedent without even acknowledging it is doing
so, much less providing any special justification.”).
111. Id. at 1337.
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both ways at different points in time. This solution requires selective
forgetting: the importance of stare decisis is trumpeted in dissent after
dissent, but the doom-and-gloom rhetoric attending each dissent is
instantly swept under the rug. The point of this strategy is to make each
transgression of stare decisis seem unprecedented, as though stare
decisis had been eroded for the first time. A less helpful understanding
of events, namely, that stare decisis has proven to be quite flexible, is
thus kept out of view.112 This approach counts on the reader’s short
memory—and, ironically, on the forgettability of the dissenter’s earlier
rhetorical flourishes.
Here, Justice Kagan provides a nice example. Two years before
Edwards, Kagan inveighed against the majority’s decision to overrule
in Knick v. Township of Scott, writing for instance: “If that is the way
the majority means to proceed—relying on one subversion of stare
decisis to support another—we may as well not have principles about
precedents at all.”113 Did Kagan mean that Knick had so abused
precedent as to effectively overrule stare decisis itself? Apparently not,
for in Edwards Kagan selected Knick as an exemplar of the Court’s
“customary, and disciplining, practice” of “consider[ing]—and usually
at length—a familiar set of factors capable of providing the needed
special justification.”114 Each vehement dissent becomes water under
the bridge.
All this raises the question of how the majority coalition might
respond to our imagined dissenter’s rhetorical strategizing. The
majority might do just what the dissenter hopes: wince at each
rhetorical lashing, try to avoid the next one, and generally think hard
before overruling.115 But there is another salient possibility: much as
the public could come to wonder whether the dissenter is overdoing it,
the majority might decide that there is no satisfying the opposition.
Someone who cannot see that overrulings are sometimes justified—or
just not a big deal—might not be worth appeasing. The majority could
then become numb to the lashing, and unafraid to overrule. The strong

112. There are starker takeaways available. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Rule of Five Guys,
119 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2021) (“The very notion that the Court is bound to follow
precedent until it formally overrules it is either naïve or disingenuous.”).
113. 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
114. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1581 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
115. The result might be rhetorical conflict. See generally Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—
Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 121 (2019) (discussing
“weaponized” stare decisis used for “rhetorical emphasis” by majorities and dissenters alike).
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rhetoric against overruling would have defeated itself.116
That reasoning can be taken still further. A cynical majority might
put itself on the lookout for precedents to overrule. Not just any
precedent will do, of course. Overruling cases that are either too
important or too sound would tend to feed the dissenter’s critical flame.
But when precedents are contrary to the would-be dissenter’s view of
the merits, or else not terribly important, a decision to overrule can put
the dissenter in a bind: she would have to moderate her rhetoric or else
risk coming across as crying wolf. Notably, Ramos and Edwards
respectively fit each half of that strategy, with Ramos appealing to (and
splintering) the Court’s left wing and Edwards “overruling” only a
never-used exception. So there is some evidence that rhetorical
strategies influence not just opinion style but also substantive outcomes
in discrete cases.
IV. WHAT ABOUT THE SHARPLY PERSONAL EXCHANGE?
Perhaps the most talked-about aspect of the Edwards opinions was
a sharp, personal exchange between the majority and the dissent. This
exchange offers a particularly stark illustration of the tension between
reason and rhetoric.
A. The Exchange
Let me start by reproducing the most relevant passages. Here is a
main-text passage that appears near the end of Kagan’s dissent:
Taking with one hand what it gave with the other, the Court
curtails Ramos’s effects by expunging Teague’s provision for
watershed rules. . . . For the first time in many decades . . . . those
convicted under rules found not to produce fair and reliable
verdicts will be left without recourse in federal courts.117

The majority responded at length. Here is an edited portion of that
riposte:
[T]he dissent asserts that the Court is not living up to the
promise of Ramos for criminal defendants. . . . [W]ith respect,
Justice Kagan dissented in Ramos. . . . [I]t is of course fair for a
dissent to vigorously critique the Court’s analysis. But it is
116. Cf. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 944 (1973) (“One possible judicial response to this style of criticism would be to conclude
that one might as well be hanged for a sheep as a goat: So long as you’re going to be told, no
matter what you say, that all you do is Lochner, you might as well Lochner.”).
117. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1581 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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another thing altogether to dissent in Ramos and then to turn
around and impugn today’s majority for supposedly
shortchanging criminal defendants. To properly assess the
implications for criminal defendants, one should assess the
implications of Ramos and today’s ruling together. And
criminal defendants as a group are better off under Ramos and
today’s decision, taken together, than they would have been if
Justice Kagan’s dissenting view had prevailed in Ramos. . . .The
rhetoric in today’s dissent is misdirected.118

Kagan then dropped a footnote rejoinder that I reproduce in full:
The majority’s final claim is that it is properly immune from
this criticism—that I cannot “turn around and impugn” its
ruling—because “criminal defendants as a group are better off
under Ramos and today’s decision, taken together, than they
would have been if my dissenting view had prevailed in
Ramos.” The suggestion is surprising. It treats judging as
scorekeeping—and more, as scorekeeping about how much
our decisions, or the aggregate of them, benefit a particular
kind of party. I see the matter differently. Judges should take
cases one at a time, and do their best in each to apply the
relevant legal rules. And when judges err, others should point
out where they went astray. No one gets to bank capital for
future cases; no one’s past decisions insulate them from
criticism. The focus always is, or should be, getting the case
before us right.119

This highly personal exchange is unusual, intense, and provocative.
And it seems to capture a deep, broad dispute about how the Court’s
cases are, and should be, decided. Perhaps for those same reasons, both
sides of the exchange are highly ambiguous.
B. Possible Readings
Many readers have been energized, outraged, or persuaded by
different parts of the above exchange, but it is surprisingly hard to tell
what it is even about.
One possibility is that the exchange is about whether to bend the
law today in light of beneficent decision-making yesterday. The dissent
encourages that takeaway, including by positing: “Judges should take
cases one at a time, and do their best in each to apply the relevant legal

118. Id. at 1561–62 (majority opinion).
119. Id. at 1581 n.8 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations and brackets omitted).
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rules.”120 But it would be shocking for even a single justice, much less a
six-justice majority, to announce open defiance of what the law
required, for any reason. And the Court says no such thing. In fact, the
Court anticipates and disclaims that very reading: “If we thought
otherwise and believed that Ramos qualified under the Court’s
precedents as a rule that applies retroactively, we would certainly say
so.”121
Another possibility is that the exchange is about remedial
equilibration. On this reading, the majority believes that Ramos’s
“promise” is best fulfilled by curbing the jury-unanimity right’s
practical consequences. Moreover, the majority faults Kagan’s contrary
approach for unjustifiably leading to an across-the-board denial of the
right. The key sentence here is one that we have already encountered:
“To properly assess the implications for criminal defendants, one
should assess the implications of Ramos and today’s ruling together.”122
This reading makes sense of why the Court tethers Edwards specifically
to Ramos. When doing remedial equilibration, it is natural to focus on
just that pair: the right and its remediation. By contrast, the dissent’s
objection to “scorekeeping,” and related focus on taking cases “one at
a time,” might be taken as an endorsement of rights-essentialism.123
Rather than evaluating rights in light of anticipated remedial rulings,
Kagan would keep those two issues apart. Both sides would thus be
endorsing reasonable but opposing jurisprudential views. Yet it’s hard
to shake the sense that each side is actually casting aspersions on the
other.
A third possibility is that the two sides are debating about personal
consistency. This framing best captures the personal nature of the
exchange. The dissent cites Kavanaugh’s Ramos concurrence no fewer
than seven times—even though that solo concurrence did not qualify
as Court precedent.124 Kagan was instead leveling a charge of
inconsistency against the author of the Edwards majority opinion,
quoting Kavanaugh by name and adding: “But that statement
precludes today’s result.”125 Kagan generalized this claim, arguing that
the Court itself was “[t]aking with one hand what it gave with the

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 1561 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1562. See also supra Section II.B.
See id. at 1581 n.8 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1574–81.
See id. at 1577–78.
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other.”126 The basic allegation here is one of hypocrisy.
The majority can then be read as both rebutting Kagan’s
inconsistency charge—which the majority labels as “rhetoric”127—and
then responding in kind. The rebuttal was that “Ramos itself explicitly
forecast today’s decision on retroactivity.”128 That characterization may
be a tad strong,129 but it’s undeniable that Ramos reserved the
watershed issue.130 So, no inconsistency there. And the response-in-kind
was the observation that Kagan, too, could be accused of inconsistency.
Given her expressed concern for “those convicted under rules found
not to produce fair and reliable verdicts,”131 why did Kagan previously
oppose affording those same people any relief whatsoever? That retort
is about as plausible as Kagan’s parallel insinuation that the Court
somehow acted inconsistently by answering a question it had
previously reserved.
On balance, the final reading is probably the most persuasive. But
while that interpretation makes the most sense of the back-and-forth,
it raises new concerns.
C. Are Kagan’s Votes Reconcilable?
Rhetoric aside, we might wonder whether Justice Kagan’s votes in
Ramos and Edwards can be reconciled. In exploring this issue, I now
focus on substance rather than the more personal back-and-forth in
Edwards.
Here’s the basic problem: a right that isn’t worth having at all seems
incapable of being worth applying retroactively in habeas cases. As
we’ve seen, the stare decisis analysis in Ramos and the watershed
analysis in Edwards are both largely about weighing the state’s reliance
interests against the defendant’s interests in accuracy and fairness. The
main practical difference here is that Ramos’s overruling in itself
126. Id. at 1581.
127. See id. at 1562 (majority opinion) (“The rhetoric in today’s dissent is misdirected.”).
128. Id. at 1561. What’s more, Kavanaugh’s Ramos concurrence expressly rejected the
watershed claim, thereby insulating Kavanaugh from the charge of having broken a “promise.”
See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1419–20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Interestingly, Edwards doesn’t
point out Kavanaugh’s early answer to the watershed issue, perhaps because doing so would too
openly shed the conceit of writing for the Court as a whole.
129. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1407 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that the watershed test
“is a demanding one, so much so that this Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal
procedure capable of meeting it.”).
130. Id. (plurality opinion) (“Nor is the Teague question even before us. Whether the right
to jury unanimity applies to cases on collateral review is a question for a future case”).
131. Edwards 141 S. Ct. at 1581 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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operated only prospectively, whereas the watershed inquiry
determined retrospective effect. So, for criminal-procedure cases, we
might think that the relevant inquiries go something like this:
 Stare decisis may be overcome when prospectively
recognizing a right is net beneficial.
 A watershed rule may be found when retroactively
recognizing a right in habeas is net beneficial.132
Kagan voted to find a watershed where she wouldn’t have
overruled in the first place. In casting that pair of votes, Kagan achieved
a first: no justice applying Teague has ever before urged retroactive
application of a new procedural rule that they had opposed.133 And
that previously unbroken pattern is unsurprising: both intuitively and
as a matter of case law, the standard for overruling is much lower than
the standard for finding a watershed. After all, lots of procedural rules
that come about through overrulings aren’t watersheds. And the
government’s reliance interests are at their apex when it comes to
disrupting long-settled convictions that comported with then-extant
Court precedent.134 So, how could reliance interests be so strong as to
defeat the right prospectively (under stare decisis), but not strong
enough to defeat the right as retroactively applied (under the
watershed exception)?135
One way out is to posit that something other than reliance interests
explained Kagan’s vote in Ramos. Perhaps Kagan didn’t think that
constitutional text and history supported a jury unanimity right; but,
once such a right was found, it was of sufficient practical importance to
qualify as a watershed rule. That explanation runs into a snag, however:
the Ramos dissent, which Kagan joined, assumed the “correctness” of
the majority’s merits analysis and rested on reliance interests alone.136

132. The Ramos plurality made a similar point, noting: “It would hardly make sense to . . .
count the State’s reliance interests in final judgments both here and again there.” Ramos, 140 S.
Ct. at 1407 (plurality opinion). Note that the bullet points state necessary conditions.
133. The statement in the main text is based on a review of the Court’s Teague cases cited
in Edwards, including at 141 S. Ct. at 1580 n.7 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
134. Dean Vikram Amar makes a similar point by distinguishing mere reliance from
detrimental reliance. Vikram David Amar, Justice Kagan’s Unusual and Dubious Approach to
(June
1,
2021)
“Reliance”
Interests
Relating
to
Stare
Decisis,
VERDICT
https://verdict.justia.com/2021/06/01/justice-kagans-unusual-and-dubious-approach-to-relianceinterests-relating-to-stare-decisis. In arguing that Kagan “got it wrong both times,” Amar
reconciles Kagan’s votes by deeming them erroneous. Id.
135. Of course, Kagan might just have changed her mind. But then one might have expected
her to say so.
136. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425–26 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I would not overrule Apodaca.
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Moreover, that sentiment comports with Kagan’s writings elsewhere.137
So, this defense requires that Kagan substantially disagreed with an
opinion that, quite in character, she chose to join. That’s possible, but
it’s also speculative.
A second possibility is that Ramos established that jury unanimity
is valuable in a way that Kagan didn’t accept when Ramos was decided.
Kagan’s dissent in Edwards seems carefully written to suggest this way
out. Take her opening volley in the sharp exchange above, with
emphasis added: “For the first time in many decades . . . . those
convicted under rules found not to produce fair and reliable verdicts
will be left without recourse in federal courts.”138 Kagan seems not to
be taking a position on whether the convictions actually were “fair and
reliable.” It sufficed that they were found not to be. And, after Ramos,
Kagan was prepared to accept that finding.
This explanation, while plausible, also encounters difficulties. What
exactly could Ramos have changed? Again, the Ramos dissent assumed
that the jury unanimity right was “correct” on the merits.139 And the
Ramos majority was noncommittal on whether or how much jury
unanimity actually improved accuracy. For the Court, it was enough to
identify the existence of an historical “rule,” without endorsing any
particular functional basis for it.140 The rest of Ramos’s reasoning
largely consists of historical claims, such as that the lack of jury
unanimity in some states sprang from an invidious desire to engage in
or foster race discrimination. The Ramos dissent disregarded that
history as not “what matters.”141 Once the Court held that that history
did matter for stare decisis, did Kagan feel obligated to view it as
relevant to the watershed inquiry as well?

Whatever one may think about the correctness of the decision, it has elicited enormous and
entirely reasonable reliance.”); id. at 1436 (“What convinces me that Apodaca should be retained
are the enormous reliance interests of Louisiana and Oregon.”).
137. Kagan often emphasizes the importance of safeguarding reliance pursuant to stare
decisis. See e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 458 (2015) (Kagan, J.) (“We would
prefer not to unsettle stable law.”).
138. See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1581 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425–26 (Alito, J., dissenting).
140. In claiming that Ramos “found” jury unanimity to foster “fair and reliable” verdicts,
Kagan reproduced the Court’s quotation of Blackstone. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1576 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395). But Ramos declined to endorse that—or any
other—functionalist basis for jury unanimity. See, e.g., id. at 1402 (“it is not our role to reassess
whether the right to a unanimous jury is ‘important enough’ to retain”); see also supra note 26.
Could Kagan have remembered Ramos as functionalist because that, in her mind, is the most
charitable way to understand it?
141. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1427 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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That leads to a third and best explanation: perhaps Kagan is
exhibiting precedential maximalism. On this view, Kagan doesn’t just
hope to preserve precedents in the sense of not overruling them. She
also wants to extend the reasoning of those precedents to their logical
conclusion, even if doing so goes beyond the precedents’ holdings or
intrudes on their reservations. That could be what Kagan meant when
she explained why she dissented in both Ramos and Edwards: “Now
that Ramos is the law, stare decisis is on its side. I take the decision on
its own terms, and give it all the consequence it deserves.”142 One might
have thought that whether Ramos had stare decisis “on its side” wasn’t
relevant, since nobody proposed overruling it. Edwards was instead
about a related but distinct issue: watersheds.
To get a better handle on precedential maximalism, consider three
ways of reading Ramos. First, the case could be read literally as holding
jury unanimity to be important enough to overrule precedent but not
necessarily to make a watershed rule. The watershed question would
simply be open, and a new inquiry would be required to answer it.
Second, a skeptical reading would, in effect, continue the dissent from
Ramos by reading that precedent to have only narrow effect, thereby
precluding watershed status. Finally, a maximalist reading would
embrace Ramos’s rhetoric rather than its reservation and then extend
the case’s reach. In choosing that last option, Kagan read the Ramos
opinions, including the concurrences, for all they could be.143 As she put
it, her dissent honored “what those opinions (often with soaring
rhetoric) proclaim.”144 So “rhetoric” prevails.
And Kagan has reason to favor rhetoric here. On reflection,
precedential maximalism makes sense for someone enthusiastic about
stare decisis. Let’s assume that Kagan’s primary goal is to prevent
overrulings. While that goal wouldn’t in itself require that cases be read
broadly in light of their rhetoric, doing so might tend to make precedent
seem more important. Precedential maximalism might operate
142. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1573 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
143. Several weeks after Edwards, Kagan elaborated: “[F]idelity to precedent . . . places
demands on the winners. They must apply the Court’s precedents—limits and all—wherever they
can, rather than widen them unnecessarily at the first opportunity.” Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct.
1761, 1801 (2021) (Kagan, J., concurring in part). This passage could be read as an endorsement
of reading case law literally, honoring precedents “limits and all.” Id. But perhaps this passage,
too, reflects a form of precedential maximalism, albeit in a subtler form. In finding a constitutional
violation, a precedent could establish only a sufficient condition for unconstitutionality. Kagan,
however, seems to treat the precedent as binding not only as to what is prohibited but also as to
what is allowed. So, again, Kagan may be reading precedent for all it can be.
144. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1578.
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somewhat like a protective buffer, shoring up the core features of stare
decisis. From this vantage point, Ramos and Edwards might as well not
have been about jury unanimity at all. The decisive consideration would
instead be that both cases afforded opportunities to glorify precedent.
And Kagan seized those opportunities—without ever expressing her
own view of the right in question.145
Is precedential maximalism defensible? One might think that
precedents should always be read literally, so that rhetoric and
reservations are treated equally. Alternatively, whether a judge treats
precedent broadly or narrowly might depend in part on the judge’s
view of the precedent’s merits.146 Or, perhaps, precedential maximalism
might generally be preferred, perhaps on the ground that it most
vigorously promotes the principle and policy of stare decisis. For
present purposes, it suffices to say that Kagan’s apparent choice to
engage in precedential maximalism represents another debatable and
underexplained aspect of her dissent.
D. Is this Entire Exchange a Waste of Time, or Worse?
The jousting between Kavanaugh and Kagan created a fascinating
spectacle, but was it good? Did it help advance valuable arguments and
principles, or undermine them?
One attractive answer is that both sides were engaged in a form of
the tu quoque or “you too” fallacy. When your opponent is inconsistent
but pretends not to be, that might prove that they exhibit a vice such as
hypocrisy, but it doesn’t actually show who’s right and who’s wrong. So
there’s generally no truth-value in leveling charges of personal
inconsistency.147 This objection would not apply to the dissent’s use of
the majority opinion in Ramos, since consistency with past precedential
rulings is an integral part of stare decisis and legal argument. But it does
apply to the dissent’s focus on Kavanaugh’s non-precedential solo
concurrence as well as to the majority’s decision to respond by singling
out Kagan for “turn[ing] around.”148
On balance, however, the majority’s charges of personal

145. As we have seen, the Ramos dissent assumed the Court was correct on the merits, and
the Edwards dissent relied on Ramos.
146. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1861 (2014); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 69 (1930) (Quid Pro Books 2012).
147. But only generally. See Scott F. Aiken, Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of
Hypocrisy, 2 INFORMAL LOGIC 155 (2008).
148. Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1561–62.
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inconsistency are worse. The majority, after all, is writing for the Court
as an institution. And why should the institution have a stake in trying
to personally criticize or embarrass a particular justice?149 Even if
Kagan had tied herself in knots, that conclusion wouldn’t demonstrate
why Justices Breyer and Sotomayor were wrong to dissent in Edwards.
Dissenters have the pain of defeat and the freedom of personal voice
to excuse their behavior. By comparison, personal attacks are beneath
the Court.
The concern here isn’t just about decorum. Perhaps Edwards
involved so many charges of personal inconsistency because
participants on both sides recognized that conventional legal
arguments wouldn’t persuade. So, in the hope of better swaying
audiences both on and off the Court, the justices may have felt justified
in turning to personal precedent—and even to ad hominem rhetoric.150
In this way, the erosion of conventional authority can become selfreinforcing. As unconventional arguments gain attention, they crowd
out normal practice. Edwards illustrates this dynamic, as the majority’s
willingness to engage in personalized rhetoric tacitly conceded the
force and legitimacy of that mode of argument, making it even more
likely to appear in the next case.
So, while I tend to side with the majority on the substance of this
dispute, I lament the Court’s decision to participate in it.
V. CONCLUSION: SHOULD WE WANT REASON, OR RHETORIC?
Having now criticized the majority, the dissent, and Justice
Gorsuch’s concurrence, let me spend a little time on self-criticism. Have
I been holding the Edwards opinions to an unrealistic standard, and an
overly academic one at that?
Perhaps so. The Edwards opinions are so interesting—and worth
sustained examination—precisely because their reasoning and rhetoric
are unusually elaborate. (Conclusory opinions are read for the content
149. Even Justice Scalia, who may have been the Court’s most outrageously ad hominem
dissenter, always kept a more professional and aloof tone in his majority opinions. See Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is one thing for separate
concurring or dissenting opinions to contain extravagances . . . . [but] it is something else for the
official opinion of the Court to do so.”).
150. On “personal precedent,” or fidelity to one’s own past opinions, see Richard M. Re,
Personal
Precedent
in
Bay
Mills,
Re’s
Judicata
(June
4,
2014)
https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/06/04/personal-precedent-in-bay-mills/. Personal
precedent may properly, or necessarily, have a role. See Richard M. Re, Precedent as Permission,
99 TEX. L. REV. 907, 947–48 (2021).
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of their diktats, but they aren’t worth poring over.) What’s more,
Kavanaugh, Kagan, and Gorsuch are all acclaimed legal writers,151 and
they pulled out all the stops on this one. So, complaining about this
decision may seem a bit like finding fault with the performances of
bemedaled Olympians.
Moreover, my criticisms focus on first-principles reasoning in a way
that may resonate more with the Ivory Tower than either the bench or
the bar. Over and again, I’ve pressed a simple theme: the Edwards
opinions are packed with provocative but incomplete or surface-level
reasoning. The opinions, in short, are largely rhetorical. To give just a
few examples: the majority never addresses its deviations from normal
appellate process, the dissent leaves the proper content of the
watershed exception undefended, and Gorsuch neglects plausible
reasons to think that his approach would afford Edwards relief. Yet the
opinions find time for accusations of personal inconsistency and zippy
one-liners.
But asking judges to generate deep, comprehensive arguments may
be both unrealistic and misguided. Despite their discretionary docket,
the justices have to resolve a lot of complex cases on a schedule. They
lack the luxury of writing a tentative, exploratory essay like the one
you’re presently reading. And they also face the daunting challenge of
reaching consensus while saying something important, persuasive, or at
least interesting.152 In Edwards, both the majority and the dissent may
have eschewed deeper arguments out of sheer necessity: there may not
have been sufficiently confident agreement to write opinions that
delved deeply into the first-principles positions. Rhetoric is what
remains.
Justice Kagan’s rhetorically magnificent dissent offers perhaps the
best example. As we have seen, Kagan faced daunting precedential
obstacles—a fact acknowledged by sympathetic but candid
commentators.153 And Kagan dealt with those obstacles in a singularly
uncompelling way, namely, by incorrectly asserting that the juryunanimity right qualified as a watershed rule under any plausible view.
Kagan’s argument is best understood as an instance of the rhetorical
device of hyperbole. Advancing her case more carefully and accurately
151. For instance, they all have won the Green Bag’s judicial writing award, with Kagan
seemingly winning almost every year.
152. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982);
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
153. See Vladeck, supra note 13.
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would have generated several problems. It could have made for tepid
prose, divided her joiners, and obligated her to do a lot of research as
well as shadowboxing with potential objectors.
The implications reach well beyond any one judge’s desire to
promote her own reputation or objectives. The legal system itself often
benefits from keeping things at a surface or rhetorical level. Cases
move faster, precedent is more flexible, and judicial opinions become
less tedious to read. Meanwhile, serious observers will be merely
entertained, not fooled, by the quick moves and catchy put-downs.
Those clear-eyed spectators care more about the bland language of
referees than the pep squad’s cheers and jeers. And the Court’s desire
to appeal to that relatively impartial audience can discourage judicial
rhetoric from being overdone or taken too seriously.154 So long as those
responsible readers hold sway, the fact that the justices don’t reason as
scholars do, or always reason so well at all, is just fine.

154. “Judges supply opinions to meet demand,”so “if we were more careful with our
compliments, perhaps judges would be more responsible, too.” Richard M. Re, A Rule Against
Fun, JOTWELL (July 22, 2021) (alteration omitted). In that sense, keeping judicial rhetoric in
check is a job not just for the justices but also for the readers of judicial opinions—that is, for us.
For if too many readers are eager to be taken in by judicial rhetoric—perhaps because it is written
by their favorite justices in pursuit of their favorite causes—then nothing will discipline the
Court’s abuse of reason.

